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Biometrics: A Grand Challenge

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Abstract

Reliable person recognition is an important problem in diverse businesses. Biometrics, recognition based on distinctive personal traits, has the potential to become an irreplaceable part of many identification systems. While successful in some niche markets, the biometrics technology has not yet delivered its promise of foolproof automatic human recognition. With the availability of inexpensive biometric sensors and computing power, it is becoming increasingly clear that broader usage of biometric technologies is being stymied by our lack of understanding of four fundamental problems: (i) How to accurately and efficiently represent and recognize biometric patterns? (ii) How to guarantee that the sensed measurements are not fraudulent? (iii) How to make sure that the application is indeed exclusively using pattern recognition for the expressed purpose (function creep [16])? (iv) How to acquire repeatable and distinctive patterns from a broad population? Solving these core problems will be required to move biometrics into mainstream applications and may also stimulate adoption of other pattern recognition applications for providing effective automation of sensitive tasks without jeopardizing individual freedoms. For these reasons, we view biometrics as a grand challenge - "a fundamental problem in science and engineering with broad economic and scientific impact[1]".

1. Introduction

Since the beginning of civilization, identifying fellow human beings has been crucial to the fabric of human society. Consequently, person identification is an integral part of the infrastructure needed for diverse business sectors such as finance, health care, transportation, entertainment, law enforcement, security, access control, border control, government, and communication.

As our society becomes electronically connected to form one big global community, it has become necessary to carry out reliable person recognition often remotely and through automatic means. Surrogate representations of identity such as passwords (prevalent in electronic access control) and cards (prevalent in banking and government applications) no longer suffice. Further, passwords and cards can be shared and thus cannot provide non-repudiation. Biometrics, which refers to automatic recognition of people based on their distinctive anatomical (e.g., face, fingerprint, iris, retina, hand geometry) and behavioral (e.g., signature, gait) characteristics, could become an *essential* component of effective person identification solutions because biometric identifiers cannot be shared or misplaced, and they intrinsically represent the individual's bodily identity. Recognition of a person by their body, then linking that body to an externally established "identity", forms a very powerful tool with tremendous potential consequences, both positive and negative. Consequently, biometrics is not only a fascinating pattern recognition research problem but, if carefully used, could also be an enabling technology with the potential to make our society safer, reduce fraud and lead to user convenience (user friendly man-machine interface) by broadly providing the following three functionalities:

(a) Positive Identification ("Is this person truly known to the system?"). Biometrics can verify with high certainty the authenticity of a claimed enrollment based on the input biometric sample. For example, a person claims that he is known as John Doe within the authentication system and offers his fingerprint; the

[1] Definition of *grand challenge* by the High Performance Computing and Communication (HPCC) program: http://www.hpcc.gov/

system then either accepts or rejects the claim based on a comparison performed between the offered pattern and the enrolled pattern associated with the claimed identity. Commercial applications such as computer network logon, electronic data security, ATMs, credit card purchases, physical access control, cellular phones, PDAs, medical records management, and distance learning are sample authentication applications. Authentication applications are typically cost sensitive with a strong incentive for being user-friendly.

(b) Large Scale Identification ("Is this person in the database?"). Given an input biometric sample, a large-scale identification determines if the pattern is associated with any of a large number (e.g., millions) of enrolled identities. Typical large-scale identification applications include welfare-disbursement, national ID cards, border control, voter ID cards, driver's license, criminal investigation, corpse identification, parenthood determination, missing children identification, etc. These large-scale identification applications require a large sustainable throughput with as little human supervision as possible.

(c) Screening ("Is this a wanted person?"). Screening applications covertly and unobtrusively determine whether a person belongs to a watch-list of identities. Examples of screening applications could include airport security, security at public events, and other surveillance applications. The screening watch-list consists of a moderate (e.g., a few hundred) number of identities. By their very nature, the screening applications (i) do not have a well-defined "user" enrollment phase; (ii) can expect only minimal control over their subjects and imaging conditions; and (iii) require large sustainable throughput with as little human supervision as possible. Neither large scale identification nor screening can be accomplished without biometrics (e.g., by using token-based or knowledge-based identification).

Well over a century has passed since Alphonse Bertillon first conceived and then industriously practiced the idea of using body measurements for identifying criminals [18]. In 1893, the Home Ministry Office, UK, accepted that no two individuals have the same fingerprints and set in motion a chain of events that led to the first Automatic[2] Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) in the 1960s. The use of AFIS as an effective tool for criminal investigation and background checks is prevalent worldwide (The AFIS system at FBI consists of a large database of approximately 46 million "ten prints" and conducts, on an average, approximately 50,000 searches per day). Over the last few decades, a number of other biometric traits have been studied, tested, and have been successfully deployed in niche markets [25,26]. Thanks to the imaginative and flattering depiction of fancy biometric systems in Hollywood Sci-Fi flicks, the popularity of AFIS, and the intuitive appeal of biometrics as a crime deterring security tool, completely automatic biometric systems give the appearance of being widespread and mature technologies. Not surprisingly, there is an overall (mis)perception in the pattern recognition community that the important research problems have been largely solved but for the clever bells and whistles needed for making this technology work in the real world.

And yet, this proverbial last mile of deployment has doggedly resisted our persistent attempts to broaden the scope of niche biometric systems to shrink-wrapped solutions. Humbled biometric road warriors everywhere seem to agree that it is not a mere matter of a superficial system tuning or clever system improvisation. These tricks have already been tried.

For example, almost a century after the fingerprints were observed to be distinctive, a 2004 fingerprint contest revealed that fingerprint matching algorithms have false non-match error rate of 2% [19]![3] If this system were to be deployed in New York City Airports (~200,000 passengers/day [14]), it would result in 4,000 false rejects every day! While the error rate of the fingerprint system can be significantly reduced by using multiple fingers, the point we want to emphasize is that the error rate is non-zero. Similarly, even though the first paper on automatic face recognition appeared in the early 1970's [11], the state of the art face recognition systems have been known to be fragile in recent operational tests [12,13]. Speaker recognition field awaits good solutions to many of the critical problems [6,24]. More recent biometric identifiers such as iris have low error rates,

[2] Many AFIS operations are actually supervised by human experts. FBI can process ~16% of the test images in the "lights out" mode - accept AFIS decisions without any manual inspection.

[3] The technology test [17] data may not be representative of a target application population but the performance is certainly representative of the order-of-magnitude estimate of the best-of-the-breed matcher capability. Operational test [17] performance is expected to be significantly lower than the technology test performance.

but also display signs of fragility in recent pilot studies (relatively high failure to enroll rates) [4]. The biometric recognition problem appears to be more difficult than perceived by the pattern recognition research community. Why is biometrics so difficult?

The complexity of designing a biometric system based on three main factors (accuracy, scale or size of the database, and usability) is illustrated in Figure 1. Many application domains require a biometric system to operate on the extreme of only one of the three axes in Figure 1 and such systems have been successfully deployed. The grand challenge is to design a system that would operate on the extremes of all these three axes simultaneously. This will entail overcoming the fundamental barriers that have been cleverly avoided in designing the currently successful niche biometric solutions. Addressing these core research problems, in the opinion of the authors, will significantly advance the state of the art and make biometric systems more secure, robust, and cost-effective. This, we believe, will promote adoption of biometric systems, resulting in potentially broad economic and social impact.



Figure 1: Biometric system characterization. Accuracy axis represents the intrinsic 1:1 accuracy of the matcher.

2. Challenges

Here we categorize the fundamental barriers in biometrics into four main categories: (i) accuracy, (ii) scale, (iii) security, and (iv) privacy.

2.1 Accuracy

The critical promise of the ideal biometrics is that when a biometric identifier sample is presented to the biometric system, it will offer the correct decision. Unlike password or token-based system, a practical biometric system does not make perfect match decisions and can make two basic types of errors: (i) *False Match:* the biometric system incorrectly declares a successful match between the input pattern and a non-matching pattern in the database (in the case of identification/screening) or the pattern associated with an incorrectly claimed identity (in the case of verification). (ii) *False Non-match:* the biometric system incorrectly declares failure of match between the input pattern and a matching pattern in the database (identification/screening) or the pattern associated with the correctly claimed identity (verification). It is more informative to report the system accuracy in terms of a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. Table 1 shows typical error rates of various biometric identifiers and Table 2 shows typical accuracy performance requirements. Even ignoring the requirements of complete automation and assuming possibility of good biometric signal acquisition from a distance, it is easy to note that there is a need to bridge the gap between the current technology and performance requirements.

Biome-tric	FTE %	FNMR %	FMR1 %	FMR2 %	FMR3 %
Face	n/a	4	10	40	12
Finger	4	2.5	<0.01	0.1	<1
Hand	2	1.5	1.5	n/a	n/a
Iris	7	6	<0.001	n/a	n/a
Voice	1	15	3	n/a	n/a

Table 1. Typical biometric accuracy performance numbers reported in large third party tests. FMR1 denotes verification match error rate, FMR2 and FMR3 denote (projected) large-scale identification and screening match error rates for database sizes of 1 million and 500 identities, respectively. n/a denotes data non-availability. The face recognition results are based on FRVT 2002 [12] and its extrapolation using Eyematic data. The fingerprint authentication errors are from [29] and assume use of right index fingers with no failures-to-enroll. Both fingerprint screening and identification assume use of 2 fingers. Fingerprint identification performance reflects state of the art AFIS performance based on 2 fingers against a 6 million person database with no failures-to-enroll [29]. The hand geometry FTE is stipulated from the incidence of severe arthritic condition in the US [28], the voice FTE from the speech disability statistics in the 1997 US census, iris FTE is from [4] and fingerprint FTE is from [2]. Hand, iris, and voice error rates are from ([17], p. 121). These numbers are based on what the authors believe to

be order of magnitude estimates of the performance of the state of the art systems. Note that the test results do not use similar test methodology or datasets of similar scale. The technologies may not be directly comparable in the extent of automation possible or sensing-at-a-distance capability.

It is important to realize that perhaps more than other pattern recognition systems, the false *rejection* of a user's claim by a biometric system is not a desirable outcome since resort will then be made to manual identification which is usually neither effective (e.g. to verify enrollment) nor feasible (e.g., large scale identification). Practical biometric systems also have significant failures both in terms of failure to acquire (FTA) and failure to enroll (FTE).

Application	FNMR%	FMR%
Authentication	0.1	0.1
Large Scale Identification	10.0	0.0001
Screening	1.0	0.0001

Table 2. Typical intrinsic matcher (1:1) performance requirements. It is assumed that large-scale identification consists of 1 million identities and screening involves 500 identities. FTA and FTE are assumed to be zero. These numbers are based on what the authors believe to be order of magnitude estimate of the performance needed for viability of a typical application.

There are three primary reasons underlying imperfect accuracy performance of a biometric system [32]. (i) *Information limitation*: The invariant and distinctive information content in the pattern samples may be inherently limited due to the intrinsic signal capacity (e.g., individuality information [10]) limitation of the biometric identifier. For instance, the distinctive information in hand geometry is less than that in fingerprints. Consequently, hand geometry measurements can differentiate fewer identities than the fingerprint signal even under ideal conditions. Information limitation may also be due to poorly controlled biometric presentation by the users or inconsistent signal acquisition (see Figure 2). Differently acquired measurements of a biometric identifier limit the invariance across different samples of the pattern. For example, information limitation occurs when there is very little overlap between the enrolled and sample fingerprints (e.g., left and right half of the finger). In such situation, even a perfect matcher cannot offer a correct matching decision. An extreme example of information limitation is when the person does not possess or cannot present the particular biometric needed by the identification system. (ii) *Representation limitation*: The ideal representation scheme should be designed to retain all invariance and discriminatory information in the sensed measurements. Practical feature extraction systems, typically based on simplistic models of biometric signal, fail to capture the richness of information in a realistic biometric signal resulting in the inclusion of erroneous features and exclusion of true features. Consequently, a significant fraction of legitimate pattern space cannot be handled by the biometric system resulting in high FTA, FTE, FMR, and FNMR. For example, the individuality information contained in minutia-based representation of fingerprints is shown in [10]. Figure 3 illustrates typical "poor quality" prints that cannot be processed by traditional minutiae-based fingerprint identification systems, although the fingerprint experts routinely use such smudged prints to make a reliable match decision. So, conventional representations and feature extraction methods are limiting the effective discrimination among the prints. (iii) *Invariance limitation:* Finally, given a representation scheme, the design of an ideal matcher should perfectly model the invariance relationship in different patterns from the same class, even when imaged under different presentation conditions. Again, in practice (e.g., due to non-availability of sufficient number of training samples, uncontrolled or unexpected variance in the collection conditions) a matcher may not correctly model the invariance relationship resulting in poor matcher accuracy. Figure 4 illustrates mated fingerprint samples with significant distortion that will fail to match when the matcher assumes a rigid transformation invariance model [23].

Figure 2: Due to change in pose, an appearance-based face recognition system will not be able to match these 3 images successfully, even though they belong to the same individual.



Figure 3: Poor quality fingerprint impressions. Minutiae extraction algorithms detect many false minutiae and miss many true minutiae.

The design challenge is to be able to arrive at a realistic representational/invariance model of the identifier from a few samples acquired under inconsistent conditions, and then, formally estimate the discriminatory information in the signal from the samples. This is especially difficult in a large-scale identification system where the number of classes/identities is huge (e.g., in the millions). One would also like to understand how to seamlessly integrate multiple biometric cues [20] to provide effective identification across the entire population.

Figure 4: Two (good quality) fingerprint impressions of the same finger exhibiting non-linear elastic deformation. A fingerprint matching algorithm that assumes a rigid transformation between the two fingerprint representations can not successfully match these two prints.

Screening systems are severely information limited. First, the conventional biometric traits that are available for unobtrusive covert capture from a distance (e.g., face and gait) offer limited discriminability. Secondly, the lack of user cooperation as well as lack of environmental control typically results in inconsistent presentation. Consequently, a two-pronged approach is necessary to offer an effective identification in screening systems: (i) exploring effective methods of spatio-temporally utilizing weak biometric cues (also called soft biometrics [21]) such as height, gait, hair color, coarse facial features, etc. to reliably identify people against the watch-list; and (ii) engineered approach to signal acquisition: significant innovation in designing active/purposive vision techniques to obtain higher resolution images. Although higher resolution creates a new set of problems (e.g., image registration inconsistency, increased processing and storage requirements), there is evidence that it can lead to better discrimination [15]. Both these approaches have not received much research attention and are fundamental barriers for the success of screening systems.

2.2 Scale

How does the number of identities in the enrolled database affect the speed and accuracy of the system? In the case of verification systems, the size of the database does not really matter since it essentially involves a 1:1 match, comparing one set of submitted samples to one set of enrollment records. In the case of large scale identification and screening systems containing a total of N identities, sequentially performing N 1:1 matches is not effective (see Table 3); there is a need for efficiently scaling the system to control throughput and false-match error rates with an increase in the size of the database.

	Authenti-cation	Large Scale ID throughput	Screening throughput
Finger	10 msec	1/min	>1/sec
Face	90 μsec	0.66/min	22/sec
Iris	< 1 μsec	> 1/sec	>2000/sec

Table 3. Achievable scaling performance for commonly used biometric technologies. The fingerprint screening assumes use of 2 fingers and fingerprint identification performance reflects state of the art AFIS performance based on 10 fingers. Face 1:1 matching speed is reported from [12,31]. Iris 1:1 matching speed is taken from [30]. These numbers do not include biometric presentation/feature extraction time and are based on what the authors believe to be order of magnitude estimate of the performance of the state of the art systems. The technologies may not be directly comparable in the extent of automation

possible, the customized hardware CPU power, or sensing-at-a-distance capability.

Typical approaches to scaling include using multiple hardware units, coarse pattern classification (e.g., first classifying a fingerprint into major classes such as Arch, Tented Arch, Whorl, Left Loop and Right Loop) and extensive use of "exogenous" data (e.g. gender, age, geographical location) supplied by human operators. Although these approaches perform well in practice, they come at a price. Using hardware linearly proportional to the database size is expensive. Coarse pattern classification offers substantial scaling advantage only when multiple measures are available (e.g., fingerprints from multiple fingers) and can add to the non-match error rates [33]. Use of exogenous information creates a mechanism for intentionally avoiding identification (e.g., dressing as the opposite sex, or appearing older)

Ideally, one would like to index the patterns in some way similar to that used in conventional databases. However, due to large intra-class variations in biometric data caused by variation in collection conditions and human anatomy/behaviors, it is not obvious how to ensure the samples from the same pattern fall into the same index bin. There have been very few published studies on reliably indexing biometric patterns [9]. Efficient indexing algorithms would need to be developed for each technology. It is unlikely that any generic approach would be applicable to all biometric measures.

False-match error rates generally increase with the number of required comparisons in a large-scale identification or watch list system. As most comparisons are "false" (e.g., a submitted sample compared to the enrollment pattern of another person), increasing the size of the database increases the number of opportunities for a "false match". Because of non-independence of sequential comparisons using the same sample data, and architectural design issues required to sustain throughput rate while limiting active memory (e.g., making multiple passes through the enrollment data, combining parametric and non-parametric measures), relationship between the number of false matches and database size is a poorly understood issue.

Although the size of the watch-list database in a screening system is significantly smaller than that in a large-scale identification, the number of "continuous/active" comparisons conducted may be huge. Therefore, as in large scale applications, the throughput and error rate issues are also critical in screening applications.

Computationally, scaling of large scale systems for almost real-time applications involving 1 million identities or screening the traffic for 500 recognized identities is becoming feasible (Table 3). However, designing and building a real-time identification system involving 100 million identities is beyond the reach of our existing understanding.

2.3 Security

The integrity of biometric systems (e.g.., assuring that the input biometric sample was indeed presented by its legitimate owner and that the system indeed matched the input pattern with genuinely enrolled pattern samples), is crucial. While there are a number of ways a perpetrator may attack a biometric system [1, 34], there are two very serious criticisms against biometric technology [35] that have not been addressed satisfactorily: (i) biometrics are not secrets and (ii) biometric patterns are not revocable. The first fact implies that the attacker has a ready knowledge of the information in the legitimate biometric identifier and, therefore, could fraudulently inject it into the biometric system to gain access. The second fact implies that when biometric identifiers have been "compromised", the legitimate user has no recourse to revoking the identifiers to switch to another set of uncompromised identifiers. We believe that the knowledge of biometric identifier(s) does not necessarily imply the ability of the attacker to inject the identifier measurements into the system. The challenge then is to design a secure biometric system that will accept only the legitimate presentation of the biometric identifiers without being fooled by the doctored or spoofed measurements injected into the system. Development of such a system would obviate the need for revoking the "compromised" identifiers.

One could attempt various strategies to thwart fraudulent insertion of spoofed measurements into the system. For example, one could use liveness detection [7, 37] to make sure the input measurements are not originating from an inanimate object. The other strategy to consider is multi-biometrics [22, 36] - data from multiple and independent biometric identifiers are fused; reinforcing the identity of a subject offers increasingly irrefutable proof that the biometric data is being presented by its legitimate owner and not being fraudulently presented by an impostor. While we can stipulate these different strategies, it remains a formidable challenge to concretely combine these component blocks to arrive at a foolproof biometric system that does not accept fraudulent data.

2.4 Privacy

A reliable biometric system provides an irrefutable proof of identity of the person. Consequently, the users have multiple concerns: Will the undeniable proof of biometrics-based access be used to track the individuals that may infringe upon an individual's right to privacy [38] and anonymity [39, 40]? Will the biometric data be abused for an unintended purpose, e.g., will the fingerprints provided for access control be matched against the fingerprints in a criminal database? Will the biometric data be used to cross-link independent records from the same person, e.g., health insurance and grocery purchases? How would one ensure and assure the users that the biometric system is being used only for the intended purpose and none other? The problem of designing information systems whose functionality is verifiable at their deployed instantiation is very difficult. Perhaps, one needs to devise a system that meticulously records authentication decisions and the people who accessed the logged decisions using a biometric-based access control system. Such a system can automatically generate alarms to the users upon observing a suspicious pattern in the system administrator's access of users' logs. One promising research direction may be biometric cryptosystems [8] - generation of cryptographic keys based on biometric samples. There are also radical approaches such as total transparency [5] that attempt to solve the privacy issues in a very novel way. While one could stipulate some ingredients of the successful strategy, there are no satisfactory solutions on the horizon for this fundamental privacy problem.

3. Discussion and Conclusions

Any system assuring reliable person recognition must necessarily involve a biometric component. Because of the unique person identification potential provided by biometrics, they have and will continue to provide useful value by deterring crime, identifying criminals, and eliminating fraud. At the same time, we are mindful of the need to provide controls to the problem of "function creep", creating systems that do not threaten basic rights to privacy and anonymity, and substantiate the business case for system deployment. Biometrics is one of the important and more interesting pattern recognition application with its associated unique legal, political and business challenges.

While this work emphasizes the open fundamental problems in biometrics, this should not be construed to imply that the existing biometric technology is not useful. In fact, there are a large number of biometric solutions that have been successfully deployed to provide useful value in practical applications. For example, the hand geometry system has served as good access control solution in many deployments such a university dorms, building entrance, time/place applications [16]. AFIS systems have been providing terrific value to the society by using a good integration of automatic and manual processes. The scope of this paper is intended to expand the frontiers of the state of the art biometric technology performance for their effective widespread deployment.

It needs to be emphasized that an emerging technology such a biometrics, is typically confronted with unrealistic performance expectations and not fairly compared with existing alternatives (e.g., passwords) that we have resigned to tolerate. A successful biometric solution does not have to be 100% accurate or secure. A particular application demands a *satisfactory* performance justifying the additional investments needed for the biometric system; the system designer can exploit the application context to engineer the system to achieve the target performance levels.

In this work, we have explored the fundamental roadblocks for widespread adoption of biometrics as a means of automatic person identification: effective and efficient pattern recognition; ensuring system integrity, system application integrity and return on investment. From pure pattern recognition perspective, the large scale identification and screening applications are the two most challenging problems – today we cannot solve them no matter how many resources we throw at them. We really need to understand the effective representation space and the invariance properties much more clearly. From system perspective, both security and privacy are open problems with no clear satisfactory solutions on the horizon, and cost savings need to be more thoroughly documented. It appears that surmounting these roadblocks will pave the way not only for inclusion of biometrics into mainstream applications but also for other pattern recognition applications.

The recognition problems have historically been very elusive and have been underestimated in terms of the effort needed to arrive at a satisfactory solution. Additionally, since humans seem to recognize people with high accuracy, biometrics has incorrectly been perceived to be an easy problem. There is no substitute to research, realistic performance evaluations [27] and standardization efforts [2] facilitating the cycle of

build-test-share for transforming the technology into business solutions.

Making the "business case" for biometrics has proved difficult for many reasons: (i) the business value of "security" and "deterrence" is always difficult to quantify, regardless of technology; (ii) fraud rates and costs of long standing business systems (e.g., PINS and passwords) are not well understood; (iii) total costs for biometrics systems have not been well documented or reported. Many recent media reports have been critical of biometric systems on the issue of return on investment [42, 43, 44] but in the view of the authors, too little research has been done on this issue to reach any firm, general conclusions.

Research funding in biometrics is negatively impacted by the lack of substantiated cost savings or increased productivity. It is hard to justify funding for additional research in basic pattern matching algorithm development when the potential financial return is not immediately apparent. Biometrics is an ideal area for computer scientists to work closely with management scientists and business specialists to develop methods for assessing long term financial returns attributable to deployed systems. We believe that the insistence on "return of investment" (ROI) issues is premature because there is *no* substitute to biometrics for effective positive identification; we strongly believe, development of reliable identity infrastructure is critical to effective functioning of the society and this infrastructure will have to necessarily involve biometrics. We, as a community, have a responsibility to chalk-out viable development of this emerging technology without encroaching on the fundamental rights of human beings. Considering the wide scope of the resultant societal impact, we believe, this responsibility needs to be substantially stimulated and shouldered by sustained and substantial R&D investment from the government agencies worldwide.

Considering the recent mandates of several governments for the nationwide use of biometrics in delivering crucial societal functions, there is a need to act with a sense of urgency. Pattern recognition systems have never been tried at such large scales nor have they dealt with such a wide use of sensitive personal information. As pattern recognition researchers, it is a great opportunity and challenge for us to make a difference in our society while engaged in the work that we love to do.

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