Contract-Switching: Value Flows and Risk Management Architecture for Future Internet

Problem Statement and Motivation - People - Publications - Deliverables - Funding

Problem Statement and Motivation

The Internet’s simple best-effort packet-switched architecture lies at the core of its tremendous success and impact. However, current Internet architecture allows neither (i) users to indicate their value choices at sufficient granularity nor (ii) providers to manage risks involved in investment for new innovative QoS technologies and business relationships with other providers as well as users. To allow these flexibilities, this project investigates “contract-switching” as a new paradigm for future Internet. Just like packet-switching enabled flexible and efficient multiplexing of data in the Internet, a contract-switched network will enable flexible and economically efficient management of risks and value flows.

 

This project focuses on the design of a contract-switching framework in the context of multi-domain QoS contracts. It addresses the challenges involved in the development of decentralized inter-domain protocol mechanisms that can dynamically compose and price complex end-to-end contracts. The project formulates this end-to-end contract composition as a “contract routing” problem, resembling the QoS routing algorithms. This research also develops an appropriate abstraction necessary for pricing of QoS contracts, dynamically composable contracts in space and time. The project employs financial engineering techniques to provide risk sharing mechanisms and money-back guarantee structures for the QoS contracts. This research brings together network architecture design and financial engineering tools. This interdisciplinary work can inspire usage of economic tools for security problems like spam and DDoS attacks. The project will be especially beneficial to the Internet policy makers.

 

People

 

Publications

  • W. Liu, H. T. Karaoglu, A. Gupta, M. Yuksel, and K. Kar, Edge-to-Edge Bailout Forward Contracts for Single-Domain Internet Services, Proceedings of IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service (IWQoS), pages 259-268, Enschede, Netherlands, June 2008. (slides)
    Abstract: Despite the huge success of the Internet in providing basic communication services, the Internet architecture needs to be upgraded so as to provide end-to-end QoS services to its customers. Currently, a user or an enterprise that needs end-to-end bandwidth guarantees between two arbitrary points in the Internet for a short period of time has no way of expressing its needs. To allow these much needed basic QoS services we propose a single-domain edge-to-edge (g2g) dynamic capacity contracting mechanism, where a network customer can enter into a bandwidth contract on a g2g path at a future time, at a predetermined price. For practical and economic viability, such forward contracts must involve a bailout option to account for bandwidth becoming unavailable at service delivery time, and must be priced appropriately to enable ISPs manage risks in their contracting and investments. Our design allows ISPs to advertise point-to-point different prices for each of their g2g paths instead of the current point-to-anywhere prices, allowing for better end-to-end paths, temporal flexibility and efficiency of bandwidth usage. We compute the risk-neutral prices for these g2g bailout forward contracts (BFCs), taking into account correlations between different contracts due to correlated demand patterns and overlapping paths. We implement this multiple g2g BFC framework on a realistic network model with Rocketfuel topologies, and evaluate our contract switching mechanism in terms of key network performance metrics like fraction of bailouts, revenue earned by the provider, and adaptability to link failures.
  • M. Yuksel, K. K. Ramakrishnan, S. Kalyanaraman, J. D. Houle, and R. Sadhvani, Class-of-Service in IP Backbones: Informing the Network Neutrality Debate, (short paper) Proceedings of ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems (SIGMETRICS), pages 465-466, Annapolis, MD, June 2008. (poster)
    Abstract: The benefit of Class-of-Service (CoS) is a heated topic in the “Network Neutrality” debate. Proponents of network neutrality suggest that over-provisioning is a viable alternative to CoS. We quantify the extra capacity requirement for an over-provisioned classless (i.e., best-effort) network compared to a CoS network providing the same delay or loss performance for premium traffic. We first develop a link model that quantifies this Required Extra Capacity (REC). To illustrate key parameters involved in analytically quantifying REC, we start with simple traffic distributions when delay or loss probability is the performance goal. Then, for more bursty and realistic traffic distributions (e.g., long-range dependent), we find the REC using ns-2 simulations of the CoS and classless link cases. Our primary contribution is in using these link models to quantify the REC for realistic network topologies (obtained from Rocketfuel) under various scenarios including link and node failures. We show that REC can be significant even when the proportion of premium traffic is small, a situation often considered benign for the over-provisioning alternative. We also show that the impact of CoS on best-effort traffic is relatively small while still providing the desired performance for premium traffic.
  • M. Yuksel, A. Gupta, and S. Kalyanaraman, Contract-Switching Paradigm for Internet Value Flows and Risk Management, Proceedings of IEEE Global Internet Symposium, Phoenix, AZ, April 2008. (slides)
    Abstract
    : The Internet’s simple design resulted in huge success in basic telecommunication services. However, in terms of providing end-to-end QoS services, the Internet’s architecture needs major shifts since it neither allows (i) users to indicate their value choices at sufficient granularity nor (ii) providers to manage risks involved in investment for new innovative QoS technologies and business relationships with other providers as well as users. Currently, users can only indicate their value choices at the access/link bandwidth level not at the routing level. Similarly, an enterprise that needs end-to-end capacity contracts between two arbitrary points on the Internet for a short period of time has no way of expressing its needs. To allow these much needed economic flexibilities, we introduce contract-switching as a new paradigm for the design of future Internet architecture. Just like packet-switching enabled flexible and efficient multiplexing of data, a contract-switched inter-network will enable flexible and economically efficient management of risks and value flows with many more tussle points.

 

Deliverables

 

Funding

This project is supported by National Science Foundation award 0721600 and 0721609.

 

Problem Statement and Motivation - People - Publications - Deliverables - Funding

Last updated on June 28, 2008